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Abstract
In her 2011 EVT/WOTE keynote, Travis County, Texas
County Clerk Dana DeBeauvoir described the qualities
she wanted in her ideal election system to replace their
existing DREs. In response, in April of 2012, the au-
thors, working with DeBeauvoir and her staff, jointly ar-
chitected STAR-Vote, a voting system with a DRE-style
human interface and a “belt and suspenders” approach
to verifiability. It provides both a paper trail and end-to-
end cryptography using COTS hardware. It is designed
to support both ballot-level risk-limiting audits, and au-
diting by individual voters and observers. The human
interface and process flow is based on modern usability
research. This paper describes the STAR-Vote architec-
ture, which could well be the next-generation voting sys-
tem for Travis County and perhaps elsewhere.
This paper is a working draft. Significant changes
should be expected as the STAR-Vote effort matures.
1 Introduction
A decade ago, DRE voting systems came with a promise
of improvement. By having a computer mediating the
user’s voting experience, they could ostensibly improve
usability through summary screens and a variety of ac-
cessibility features including enlarged text, audio out-
put, and specialized input devices. They also promised
to improve the life of the election administrator, yield-
ing quick, accurate tallies without any of the ambiguities
that come along with hand-marked paper ballots. And,
of course, they were promised to be secure and reliable,
tested and certified. In practice, much of this was wishful
thinking.
Many current DRE voting systems experienced their
biggest sales volume following the demonstrated failures
of punch card voting systems in Florida in the 2000 presi-
dential election. The subsequent Help America Vote Act
provided a one-time injection of funds that made these
purchases possible. Now, a decade later, these machines
are near the end of their service lifetimes.
Last year, the election administration office of Travis
County, Texas, an early adopter of these DRE systems,
concluded that current systems on the market were in-
adequate for their need to replace their end-of-life DRE
systems. They were also unhappy with the current-
generation precinct-based optical scanned paper ballot
systems for a variety of reasons. In particular, hand-
marked paper ballots open the door to ambiguous voter
intent, which Travis County unhappily had to deal with
in its previous centrally-tabulated optical scan system.
They didn’t want to go back. Likewise, with early voting
and election day vote centers that must be able to give
any voter who arrives at any location the proper ballot
style, pre-printed paper ballots would be a management
nightmare. Ballot-on-demand printing systems require
laser printers that cannot run all day on battery backup
systems1, which restricts their reliability.
A group of academic experts in voting systems was
assembled to design a replacement system in sufficient
detail that bids could be solicited from manufacturers to
implement the system. Our group included experts in
cryptography, auditing, and usability, leading to some in-
teresting challenges and questions. We were given sev-
eral basic constraints: The user experience must resem-
ble current DRE systems, but there should be a tangible
voter-verifiable paper ballot, printed by the machine and
deposited by the voter into a physical ballot box. This
would allow for fast machine tallies and statistical au-
dits to ensure their equivalence to the paper records. The
system must be able to run all day on battery power. We
were free to recommend sophisticated end-to-end crypto-
graphic methods, privacy-preserving risk-limiting audit-
1A laser printer may consume as much as 1000 watts while printing.
A reasonably good UPS, weighing 26 kg, can provide that much power
for only ten minutes. Since a printer must take time to warm up for each
page when printed one-off (perhaps 10 seconds total per page), as few
as 60 ballots could be printed before the battery would be exhausted.
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ing methods, and pretty much anything else we felt was
beneficial, within these constraints. Of course, reducing
cost was also desirable as was anything that might reduce
the burden for poll workers or voters. The issue of fed-
eral or state election certification, for the purpose of this
exercise, was considered out of scope. (Yes, it’s a real
challenge, but it wasn’t our challenge.)
2 Voter Flow
Figure 1 shows how STAR-Vote works from the perspec-
tive of a voter going through the system. The STAR-
Vote voting system bears a resemblance to the Hart In-
terCivic eSlate system and to VoteBox [20], in that the
voting machines are networked together, simplifying the
movement of data. Like eSlate, our design contains a
networked group of voting machines that share a com-
mon judge’s station with a computer like Hart Inter-
Civic’s “Judge Booth Controller” (JBC) that manages ev-
erything.
1. Check-in (pollbook). The first step for the voter is to
check-in with a poll worker. This is where voter reg-
istration is verified and the voter’s precinct is iden-
tified so that the appropriate ballot style can be gen-
erated. The voter also signs into some sort of paper
book. Subsequently, the voter will receive some-
thing to take to the judge’s station that identifies the
proper ballot style for the voter. If the voter’s reg-
istration cannot be verified, a provisional ballot will
be used. Notably, there will not be an electronic
path between the voter registration phase and sub-
sequent phases.2 Instead, the token, likely from a
thermal printer, will only offer a number to identify
the ballot style. This might also be encoded as a
one-dimensional bar code to reduce data entry er-
rors. Nothing on this token is secret, nor is it unique
to any individual voter.
2. Receive token. The voter takes the ballot-style iden-
tifying token to a poll worker at the judge’s station
which then issues another token, again probably a
piece of paper with a 5-digit code on it. (There will
probably need to be a special alternative for ADA
compliance as not all voters can see or handle pa-
per.)
3. Select machine. The voter possibly queues at this
point, and then selects from one of the available vot-
ing stations.
2 It would actually be possible to allow provisional voters to vote
along with other voters uses the STAR sytem and tag the record for
posible later removal, but for simplicity we do not include this process
herein.
4. Enter token. The first thing the voter does at the
voting station is enter the digits on the token. This
action, in turn indicates the voter’s authenticity and
identifies the desired ballot style. The token will
also be flagged as provisional if that applies. Once
the voter enters the code, it’s transmitted over the lo-
cal network to the judge’s station, invalidating it im-
mediately. Only a small number of these codes will
ever be active at any time, allowing codes to be gen-
erated randomly and reused through the day. There
will be no permanent record binding this code to the
voter, as that could compromise voter anonymity.3
5. Make selections. The voter makes selections on the
GUI (for sighted voters) or auditory UI (for non-
sighted voters). There is a review screen (or the au-
ditory equivalent) so that the voter can confirm all
selections before producing a paper record.
6. Print. When the voter has finished making se-
lections, the voting terminal prints two (possibly
joined) items: (1) a paper ballot which includes a
human-readable summary of the voter’s selections
and a random (non-sequential) serial number, and
(2) a paper a take-home receipt that identifies the
voting terminal used, the time of the vote, and a
short (16-20 character) hash code which serves as a
commitment to the vote but does not reveal its con-
tents. The voting terminal also sends data about the
vote and receipt to the judge’s station.4
7. Review printed record. The voter may then review
the printed record to confirm the indicated selec-
tions. There will be at least one station available
that can OCR the paper record and read it back to
the voter for those who cannot visually read the pa-
per record.
8. Option: Cast or challenge/spoil. After reviewing
the ballot, the voter has a choice: Cast the ballot or
spoil it. A voter might spoil the ballot because of
an error (or change of heart) or because the voter
wishes to challenge the voting terminal, demanding
it to show that the voter’s selections were correctly
recorded and committed to.5 The two procedures
are described below. Note also that there is a special
procedure for provisional ballots.
3Hart InterCivic generates comparable codes, but they’re not ran-
dom. Every voter’s code is unique to that voter / judge station combi-
nation. STAR-Vote fixes this problem.
4 Specifically, the voting terminal sends the judge’s station the raw
ballot selections, an encryption of the ballot selections, the hash code
derived from this encryption which is printed on the voter’s take-home
receipt, and the serial number which is printed on the paper ballot sum-
mary.
5 This follows the cryptographic verification process introduced by
Benaloh in [1] and [2].
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Figure 1: The design of the STAR-Vote system. Green objects are computers, white objects are paper records, and
other objects are shaded in gray. Arrows display the flow of information; green for digital information, black for paper,
and dashed lines indicate that the flow is contingent on voter choice..
3
Regardless of which case, the voter may keep the
take-home paper receipt. We note that most thermal
printers include a cutting device that leaves a small
paper connection between the two sides of the cut.
It is therefore a simple matter for the voting terminal
to print a single sheet that the voter can easily sepa-
rate into the ballot summary and the take-home re-
ceipt. We also note that “privacy sleeves” (i.e., sim-
ple paper folders) can protect the privacy of these
printed ballots as voters carry them from the voting
machine to either the ballot box, to be cast, or the
judge’s station, to be spoiled.
(a) Cast ballot. A voter who wishes to cast the
ballot takes the paper ballot summary to the
ballot box. The ballot box has a simple scan-
ner that can read the serial number from the
ballot (the serial number might also be repre-
sented as a one-dimensional barcode for reli-
ability) and communicate this to the judge’s
station, allowing the judge’s station to keep
a record of which ballots have found their
way to the ballot box, and thus, which bal-
lots should be tabulated. An electronic ballot
record is not considered complete and should
not be included in the tally unless and until its
corresponding paper ballot summary has been
deposited in the balot box.
(b) Spoil ballot. If the paper record is to be
spoiled, the voter returns to a poll worker at
a judge’s station. The ballot serial number is
scanned so that the judge’s station can record
that the ballot is to be spoiled. Furthermore,
the judge’s station knows that the correspond-
ing encrypted ballot record should never be
used in a real tally. Instead, it should be de-
crypted and published as such. The original
printed paper ballot thus corresponds to a com-
mitment by the voting machine, before it ever
knew it might be challenged. If the voting ma-
chine cannot produce a suitable proof that the
ballot encryption matches the plaintext, then
it’s been caught cheating. Of course, for vot-
ers who don’t care about verification, they can
simply restart the process. For voters who
may feel uncomfortable with this process, as
it might reveal their intent to a poll worker, we
note that voters could deliberately spoil bal-
lots that misstate their true intent. We note that
dedicated election monitors could be allowed
to use voting machines, producing printed bal-
lots that they would be forbidden from placing
in the ballot box, but which would be spoiled
and then the corresponding ciphertext would
be decrypted. In effect, election monitors can
conduct parallel testing in the field on any vot-
ing machine at any time during the live elec-
tion.
(c) Provisional ballot. In the case of a provi-
sional ballot, the voter does not have the cast
vs. spoil option, and must return the ballot to a
poll worker, who places it into a distinct provi-
sional ballot box. The voter may retain the re-
ceipt to see if the ballot ends up being counted.
9. At home (optional): Voter checks crypto. The en-
crypted votes will be posted on a public “bulletin
board” (i.e., a web site maintained by the county).
The voter receipt corresponds to a cryptographic
hash of the encrypted vote. A voter should be able
to easily verify that this vote is present on the bul-
letin board. If a voter spoiled a ballot, that should
also be visible on the bulletin board together with
its decrypted selections. This allows independent
observers to know which ballots to include in the
tally and allows independent verifiers to check that
all spoiled ballots are correctly decrypted. Individ-
ual voters can check, without any mathematics, that
the decryptions of their own spoiled ballots match
their expectations.
3 Design
From the perspective of voters, the process of registra-
tion and poll-station sign-in is unchanged from current
practice. Once authorized, voters proceed to a voting ter-
minal where they use rich interface that prevents over-
votes, warns of undervotes, and supports alternative in-
put/output media for disabled and impaired voters. The
printed ballot summary, as well as the corresponding
electronic ballot record, includes a variety of crypto-
graphic features, which we now describe.
3.1 Crypto Overview
From the perspective of election officials, the first new
element in the election regimen is to generate the crypto-
graphic keys. A set of election trustees is designated as
key holders and a threshold number is fixed. The func-
tional effect is that if there are n election trustees and
the threshold value is k, then any k of the n trustees can
complete the election, even if the remaining n−k are un-
available. This threshold mechanism provides robustness
while preventing any fewer than k of the trustees from
performing election functions that might compromise
voter privacy. Threshold cryptosystems are straight-
forward extensions of traditional public-key cryptosys-
tems [7].
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The trustees each generate a key pair consisting of a
private key and a public key; they publish their public
keys. A standard public procedure is then used to com-
pute a single public key from the n trustee public keys
such that decryptions can be performed by any k of the
trustees. This single election public key K is published
and provided to all voting terminals together with all nec-
essary ballot style information to be used in the election.
Each voting terminal is also seeded with a start value z0
that includes a unique identifier for both the voting office
and the election.
During the election, voters use voting terminals to
make their selections. Once selections are completed, the
voting terminal produces paper printouts of two items.
The first is the paper ballot summary which consists of
the selections made by the voter and also includes a ran-
dom (non-sequential) serial number. The second is a re-
ceipt that consists of an identification number for the vot-
ing terminal, the date and time of the vote, and a short
(16-20 character) hash of the encryption of the voter’s
selections together with the previous hash value. Specif-
ically, if the voter’s selections are denoted by v, the ith
hash value produced by a particular voting terminal m in
an election is computed as
zi = H(EK(v),m,zi−1)
where H denotes the hash function and E denotes en-
cryption.
The voting terminal should retain both the encrypted
ballots and the current hash value. At the conclusion of
the election (if not sooner), the encrypted ballots should
be posted on a publicly-accessible web page and digi-
tally signed by the election office using a simple signa-
ture key (not the key generated by the trustees). The
posting of each encrypted ballot should also include a
non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof that the
ballot is well-formed. Once they receive their ballots
summaries and take-home receipts, voters may either de-
posit their ballot summaries into a ballot box or take them
to a poll-worker and have them spoiled. Ballot sum-
maries deposited in a ballot box have their serial num-
bers scanned and recorded. The electronically stored
encrypted vote is not considered complete (and not in-
cluded in the tally) unless and until its corresponding se-
rial number has been recorded in the ballot box.
Any electronic stored encrypted ballots for which
no corresponding serial number has been scanned and
recorded are deemed spoiled. The published election
record should include all spoiled ballots as well as all cast
ballots, but for each spoiled ballot the published record
should also include a verifiable decryption of the bal-
lot’s contents. Voters should be able to easily look up
digitally-signed records for any receipts they hold and
verify their presence and, for spoiled receipts, the ballot
contents.
A voter who takes a completed paper ballot summary
to a poll worker can request that the poll worker spoil the
ballot and give the voter an opportunity to re-vote. The
poll worker marks both the take-home receipt and the
paper ballot summary as spoiled (including removing or
marking the serial number so that it will not be recorded
if subsequently placed in the ballot box) and returns the
spoiled ballot summary to the voter.
Upon completion of the election, the election office
homomorphically combines the cast ballots into an ag-
gregate encryption of the election tally (this can be as
simple as a multiplication of the public encrypted bal-
lots). At least k of the election trustees then each perform
their share of the decryption of the aggregate as well as
individual decryptions of each of the spoiled ballots. The
trustees also post data necessary to allow observers to
verify the accuracy of the decryptions.
A privacy-preserving risk-limiting audit is then per-
formed by randomly selecting paper ballot summaries
and matching each selected ballot with a correspond-
ing encrypted ballot to demonstrate the correct matching
and provide software-independent evidence of the out-
come [19, 15, 23].
3.2 Triple Assurance
Three lines of evidence are produced to support each
election outcome [23]. The homomorphic tallying pro-
cess proves that the announced tally corresponds to the
posted encrypted ballot records. The ballot challenge
and receipt checking processes allow voters to check that
these encrypted ballot records correctly reflect their se-
lections. The risk-limiting audit process provides an in-
dependent check that a hand count of the paper ballots
matches the outcome which a hand count of the paper
records would produce. In addition, the paper records
remain available in case of systemic failure of the elec-
tronic records or if a manual count is ever desired. The
paper and electronic records are conveyed to the local
election office separately, providing additional physical
security of the redundant audit trail.
The design of the election system ensures that all three
of these checks should be perfectly consistent. There is
sufficient information in the records so that if any dis-
crepancies arise (for instance because of loss of some
of the electronic or paper records), the discrepancies can
be isolated to individual ballots that are mismatched or
counted differently.
3.3 Software and Hardware Engineering
An important criteria for STAR-Vote is that it should
leverage commodity components whenever feasible.
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This reduces cost and simplifies the ability for an elec-
tion administrator to replace aging hardware by sourcing
it from multiple vendors. While this paper isn’t intended
to cover certification issues, the separation of hardware
and software allows for the possibility of commercial off-
the-shelf (COTS) hardware, which could be subject to a
lower bar for certification than the software.
Ideally, the voting terminals and the judge station
could use identical hardware. In particular, we believe
that a reasonable target might be “point of sale” termi-
nals. These are used in restaurants worldwide. They
are used in relatively demanding environments and, on
the inside, are ordinary PCs, sometimes built from low-
power laptop-class parts. The only missing hardware
from a COTS point of sale terminal, relative to our needs
for STAR-Vote, are a printer and a battery.
If you want a reliable, low-power printer, without hav-
ing to worry about consumable ink or toner, there’s only
one choice: thermal printers. They come in a variety of
widths, up to US Letter size. Thermal paper, particu-
larly higher cost thermal paper, can last for years in an
air-conditioned warehouse, although some experimenta-
tion would be required to see whether it can survive an
un-air-conditioned trip in a hot car in the summer. Every
shipping label from major online vendors like Amazon
is printed thermally, lending some credence to its surviv-
ability in tough conditions.
Specifying a battery is more complicated. We could
require that the voting terminal have an internal (and re-
movable) battery, but this eliminates COTS point of sale
terminals. Tablet computers come with built-in batteries
that, at least in some cases, can last all day. Tablet com-
puters have smaller screens than we might prefer, and
we would have to worry about theft. Also, we would
prefer to use wired networks, rather than the wireless
networks built into most tablets. Perhaps the right an-
swer is to specify a point of sale terminal with an external
battery, and hope a vendor can do this without extensive
customization.
For the software layer, we see no need for anything
other than a commodity operating system, like Linux,
which can be stripped of unessential features to reduce
the attack surface. For example, we don’t need a full-
blown window system or 3D graphics pipeline. All we
need are basic pre-rendered ballots, as in pVote [25, 24]
or VoteBox [20]. We would specify that the voting
system software be engineered in a type-safe language
like Java or C# (eliminating buffer overflow vulnerabili-
ties, among other problems) and we would also specify
that the software be engineered with privilege separa-
tion [17], running separate parts of the voting software
as distinct applications, with distinct Unix user-ids, and
with suitably reduced privileges. For example, the stor-
age subsystem can maintain append-only storage for bal-
lots. The voter-facing UI would then have no direct ac-
cess to ballot storage, or the network, and could be “re-
booted” for every voter. Consequently, a software com-
promise that impacts the UI application could impact at
most one voter.
A separation architecture like this also provides some
degree of protection over sensitive cryptographic key
materials, e.g., if we want every voting terminal to have
a unique private key to compute digital signatures over
ballots, then we must restrict the ability for compromised
software to extract the private keys. DStar [26], for ex-
ample, used this technique to protect the key material in
an SSL/TLS web server.
4 Usability
4.1 Design Considerations
In designing this reference voting system it was impor-
tant to maximize the usability of the system within the
framework of enhanced security and administrative ex-
pediency. The overall design of the system was strongly
influenced by usability concerns. For example, a pro-
posal was put forth to have all voters electronically re-
view the paper record on a second station; this was re-
jected on usability grounds. ISO 9241 Part 11 [12] spec-
ifies the three metrics of usability as effectiveness, effi-
ciency, and satisfaction, and these are the parameters we
attempt to maximize in this design. Effectiveness of the
system means that users should be able to reliably ac-
complish their task, as they see it. In voting, this means
completing a ballot that correctly records the candidate
selections of their choice, whether that be though indi-
vidual candidate selection by race, straight party voting,
or candidate write–ins. Efficiency measures the ability
of a voter to complete the task with a minimum of effort,
as measured through time on task or number of discrete
operations required to complete a task. Efficiency is im-
portant because users want to complete the voting task
in the minimum amount of time and voting officials are
concerned about voter throughput. Reduced efficiency
means longer lines for waiting voters, more time in the
polling booth, and more equipment costs for election of-
ficials. Satisfaction describes a user’s subjective assess-
ment of the overall experience. While satisfaction does
not directly impact a voter’s ability to cast a vote in the
current election, it can have direct impact on their will-
ingness to engage in the process of voting at all, so low
satisfaction might disenfranchise voters even if they can
cast their ballots effectively and efficiently. How does
this design seek to maximize these usability metrics? For
voting systems, the system must generally be assumed to
be walk-up-and-use. Voting is an infrequent activity for
most, so the system must be intuitive enough that little
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to no instruction is required to use. The system should
minimize the cognitive load on voters, so that they can
focus on making candidate selections and not on system
navigation or operation. The system should also mitigate
the kinds of error that humans are known to make, and
support the easy identification and simple correction of
those errors before the ballot is cast.
Why not paper? Paper ballots (bubble ballots in par-
ticular) exhibit many positive characteristics that make
them highly usable [10, 4]. Users are familiar with paper,
and most have had some experience with bubble-type
item selection schemes. Voting for write-in candidates
is simple and intuitive. Unlike electric voting machines,
paper is nearly 100% reliable and is immune from issues
of power interruption. Further, paper leaves an auditable
trail, and wholesale tampering is extremely difficult. For
all these benefits, paper is not the perfect solution. Voters
actually show higher satisfaction with electronic voting
methods than they do with paper [8] and paper still has
some significant weaknesses that computers can over-
come more easily. First, the ambiguity that can be caused
by partial marks leads to substantial problems in count-
ing, recounting, and re-intrpeting paper ballots. Second,
voting by individuals with disabilities can be more eas-
ily accommodated using electronic voting methods (e.g.,
screen readers, jelly switches). Third, electronic voting
can significantly aid in the reduction of error (e.g. under-
votes, overvotes, stray marks) by the user in the voting
process. Forth, electronic voting can more easily sup-
port users whose first language is not English, since ad-
ditional ballots for every possible language request do
not have to be printed, distributed and maintained at ev-
ery polling location. This advantage is also evident in
early voting and vote center administration; rather than
having to print, transport, secure, and administer every
possible ballot for every precinct, the correct ballot can
simply be displayed for each voter. The use of comput-
ers also allows for the inclusion of sophisticated security
and cryptography measures that are more difficult to im-
plement in a pure paper format. Finally, administration
of the ballots can be easier with electronic formats, since
vote counting and transportation of the results are more
efficient. We have taken a hybrid approach in this design,
by using both paper and electronic voting methods in or-
der to create a voting system that retains the benefits of
each medium while minimizing their weaknesses.
Usability vs Security Usability and security are often
at odds with each other. Password design is a perfect
example of these opposing forces. A system that re-
quires a user have a 32-character password with upper
and lower case letters, digits, and symbols with no iden-
tifiable words imbedded might be highly secure, but it
would have significant usability issues. Further, secu-
rity might actually be compromised as users would be
likely to write the password down and leave it in an inse-
cure location (like the computer monitor). In voting we
must strive for maximum usability while not sacrificing
the security of the system (our security colleagues might
argue that we need to maximize security while not sac-
rificing usability). In our implementation, many of the
security mechanisms are invisible to the user. Those that
are not invisible are designed in such a way that only
those users who choose to exercise the enhanced secu-
rity/verifiability of the voting process are required to nav-
igate additional tasks (e.g., ballot challenge, post-voting
verification).
Error reduction The use of computers in combination
with paper is anticipated to reduce errors committed by
voters. Because voters will fill out the ballot on elec-
tronic voting terminals, certain classes of errors are com-
pletely eliminated. For example, it will be impossible to
over vote or make stray ballot marks, as the interface will
preclude the selection of more than a single candidate per
race. Under voting will be minimized by employing se-
quential race presentation, forcing the voter to make a
conscious choice to skip a race [11]. Undervotes will
also be highlighted in color on the review screen, provid-
ing further opportunity for users to reduce undervotes.
This review screen will also employ a novel party identi-
fication marker (described below) that will allow a voter
to easily discern the party for which they cast a vote in
each race. The use of the paper ballot (printed when the
voter signals completion) provides the voter with a final
additional chance to review all choices before casting the
final ballot.
4.2 User Interface Design Specification
The basic design for the UI is a standard touchscreen
DRE with auditory interface for visually impaired vot-
ers and support for voter-supplied hardware controls for
physical impairments (e.g., jelly switches).
The VVSG The starting point for UI specifications is
the 2007 version of the Voluntary Voting System Guide-
lines (VVSG). These guidelines specify many of the crit-
ical properties required for a high-quality voting system
user interface, from simple visual properties such as font
size and display contrast to more subtle properties such
as ballot layout. They also require that interfaces meet
certain usability benchmarks in terms of error rates and
ballot completion time. We believe that no extant com-
mercial voting UI meets these requirements, and that any
new system that could meet them would be a marked im-
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provement in terms of usability. That said, there are some
additional requirements that we believe should be met.
Accessibility While the VVSG includes many guide-
lines regarding accessibility, more recent research aimed
at meeting the needs of visually-impaired voters [16] has
produced some additional recommendations that should
be followed. These include:
• The system should include an auditory interface
than can be used either alone or in conjunction with
the visual interface.
• Speech rate (as well as volume) should be ad-
justable by the voter.
• In order to maximize intelligibility, a synthesized
male voice should be used so that speed can be al-
tered without changing pitch.
• Navigation should allow users to skip through sec-
tions of speech that are not important to them as
well as allowing them to replay any parts they may
have missed or not comprehended the first time.
• At the end of the voting process, a review of the
ballot must be included, but should not be required
for the voter.
Review Screens Another area where the VVSG can
be augmented concerns review screens. Voter detection
of errors (or possible malfeasance) on review screens is
poor [9], but there is some evidence that UI manipula-
tions can improve detection in some cases [5]. Thus,
STAR-Vote requires the following in addition to the re-
quirements listed in the VVSG:
• Full names of contests and candidates should be dis-
played on the review screen; that is, names should
be text-wrapped rather than cut off. Party affiliation
should also be displayed.
• Undervotes should be highlighted using an orange-
colored background.
• Activating (that is, touching on the visual screen or
selecting the relevant option in the auditory inter-
face) should return the voter to the full UI for the
selected contest.
• In addition to party affiliation in text form, graphic
markings should be used to indicate the state of
each race: voted Republican, voted Democratic,
voted Green, etc.—with a distinctive graphic for
“not voted” as well. These graphic markings (per-
haps a donkey for the Democratic Party, an elephant
for the Republican Party, etc.) should be highly dis-
tinguishable from each other so that a rapid visual
scan quickly reveals the state of each race.
Paper Record The VVSG has few recommendations
for the paper record. For usability, the paper record
should meet the VVSG guidelines for font size and
should contain full names for office and candidate. To
enable scanner based recounts (if necessary), the font
used should be OCR-friendly. Contest names should
be left-justified while candidate names should be right-
justified to a margin that allows for printing of the same
graphic symbols used in the review screen to facili-
tate rapid scanning of ballots for anomalies. Candidate
names should not be placed on the same line of text as the
contest name and a thin horizontal dividing line should
appear between each office and the next in order to min-
imize possible visual confusion.
4.3 Issues that still need to be addressed
There are still several issues that need to be addressed in
order to make the system have the highest usability. The
first of these is straight party voting (SPV). SPV can be
quite difficult for a voter to understand and accomplish
without error, particularly if voters intend to cross-vote in
one or more races [6]. Both paper and electronic methods
suffer from these difficulties, and the optimum method of
implementation will require additional research. Races
in which voters are required to select more than one can-
didate (k of n races) also create some unique user diffi-
culties, and solutions to those problems are not yet well
understood.
5 Audit
The E2E feature of STAR-Vote enables individual voters
to confirm that their votes were included in the tabula-
tion, and that the encrypted votes were added correctly.
The challenge feature, if used by enough voters, assures
that the encryption was honest and that substantially all
the votes are included in the tabulation. But there might
not be many voters who challenge the system; the vot-
ers who do are hardly representative of the voting public;
and some problems may go unnoticed.
The paper audit trail enables an entirely independent
check that the votes were tabulated accurately, that the
visible trace of voter intent as reflected in the ballot
agrees with the encryption, and, importantly, that the
winners reported by the voting system are the winners
that a full hand count of the audit trail would reveal.
The key is to audit the machine interpretation against a
manual interpretation of the paper ballots, using a risk-
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limiting method. STAR-Vote uses SOBA [3] for this pur-
pose.
A risk-limiting audit guarantees a large minimum
chance of a full hand count of the audit trail if the re-
ported outcome (i.e., the set of winners) disagrees with
the outcome that the full hand count would reveal. The
full hand count then sets the record straight, correcting
the outcome before it becomes official. Risk-limiting au-
dits are widely considered best practice for election au-
dits [14].
The most efficient risk-limiting audits, ballot-level
comparison audits, rely on comparing the machine in-
terpretation of individual ballots (cast vote records or
CVRs) against a hand interpretation of the same ballots
[22, 3, 15]. Current federally certified voting systems do
not report cast vote records, so they cannot be audited
using the most efficient techniques [15, 23]. This neces-
sitates expensive work-arounds.6 The preamble to con-
ducting a ballot-level comparison audit using currently
deployed voting systems can annihilate the efficiency ad-
vantage of ballot-level comparison audits [23].
A big advantage of STAR-Vote is that it records and
stores individual cast vote records in a way that can
be linked to the paper ballot each purports to represent,
through the encrypted vote data. This makes ballot-level
comparison audits extremely simple and efficient. It also
reduces the vulnerability of the audit to human error,
such as accidental changes to the order of the physical
ballots.7
A comparison audit can be thought of as consisting
of two parts: Checking the addition of the data,8 and
randomly spot-checking the accuracy of the data added,
to confirm that they are accurate enough for their sum
to give the correct electoral outcome. The data are the
votes as reported by the voting system. For the audit to
be meaningful, the election official must commit to the
vote data before the pot-checking begins. Moreover, for
the public to verify readily that the reported votes sum
to the reported contest totals, it helps to publish the indi-
vidual reported votes. However, if these votes were pub-
lished ballot by ballot, pattern voting could be used to
signal voter identity, opening a communication channel
6For instance, a transitive audit might require marking the bal-
lots with unique identifiers or keeping them in a prescribed order, re-
scanning all the ballots to make digital images, and processing those
images with software that can construct CVRs from the images and
associate the CVRs with the ballots. That software in turn needs to
be programmed with the all the ballot definitions in the contest, which
itself entails a great deal of error-prone handwork.
7For instance, we have seen groups of ballots dropped on the floor
accidentally; even though none was lost, restoring them to their original
order was impossible.
8This presupposes that the contest under audit is a plurality, major-
ity, super-majority, or vote-for-k contest. The operation that must be
checked to audit an instant-runoff contest is not addition, but the same
principle applies.
that might enable widespread wholesale coercion [18, 3].
The SOBA risk-limiting protocol [3] solves both of
these problems: It allows the election official to com-
mit cryptographically and publicly to the vote data; it
publishes the vote data in plain text but “unbundled” into
separate contests so that pattern voting cannot be used to
signal. Moreover, the computations that SOBA requires
are extremely simple (and could be simplified even fur-
ther using the results in [15]). The simplicity increases
transparency, because observers can confirm that the cal-
culations were done correctly, using a pencil and paper
or a hand calculator.
The encrypted vote data on the ballot that STAR-Vote
produces serves as a unique ballot identifier, an ingre-
dient that simplifies SOBA procedures because it elimi-
nates the need to store ballots in a rigid order. Moreover,
because the voting terminal generates both the electronic
vote data and the paper ballot, the audit should find very
few if any discrepancies between them.
But since voters and election workers will handle the
ballots in transit from the voting terminal to the scanner
to the audit, voters might make marks on their ballots.
Depending on the rules in place for ascertaining voter in-
tent from the ballot, those marks might be interpreted as
expressing voter intent different from the printed selec-
tions, in which case the SOBA audit might find discrep-
ancies.
It could also happen that a ballot enters the ballot
box but its serial number is not picked up, so the elec-
tronic vote data ends up in the “untallied but unspoiled”
group. This should be detectable by a compliance au-
dit [3, 15, 23] as a mismatch between the number of
recorded votes and the number of pieces of paper, pro-
viding an opportunity to resolve the problem before the
audit begins.
If such cases remain and turn up in the audit sample,
SOBA would count them as discrepancies and the sam-
ple would expand accordingly, either until there is strong
evidence that the electoral outcomes are correct despite
any errors the audit uncovers, or until there has been a
complete hand count.
The random selection of ballots for the SOBA audit
should involve public participation in generating many
bits of entropy to seed a high-quality, public, pseudo-
random number generator (PRNG), which is then used
to select a sequence of ballots to inspect manually [15].
(For instance, audit observers might roll 10-sided dice
repeatedly to generate a 20-digit number.) Publishing
the PRNG algorithm adds transparency by allowing ob-
servers to verify that the selection of ballots was fair.
6 The Cryptographic Workflow
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The core elements The most important cryptographic
element in STAR-Vote is the cryptosystem that is used to
encrypt ballots. This should be a threshold cryptosystem
(so that decryption capabilities are distributed to protect
voter privacy) that has an additive homomorphic prop-
erty (to allow individual encrypted ballots to be com-
bined into an aggregate encryption of the tally). An ex-
ponential version of the Elgamal cryptosystem satisfies
the required properties.
Cryptographic key generation can be accomplished in
one of two ways, depending on the availability of the
election trustees and the desired amount of robustness.
The preferred approach is a two-step process, but a sim-
pler one-step process can be used if the robustness is
eliminated. At the end of the key generation procedure,
the trustees each hold a private key share that does not
contain any information on the full private key, and the
unique public key K corresponding to those shares is
published.
During the polling phase, the ballot marking devices
encrypt the votes of each voter using the public key
K. This encryption procedure is randomized in order to
make sure that two votes for the same candidates result
in ciphertexts that look independent to any observer.
A short hash value of each ciphertext is also computed,
e.g., by truncating the output of the SHA-256 hash func-
tion. This hash provides a unique fingerprint of the bal-
lot, which is provided to the voter as part of the take-
home receipt. All the ciphertexts and hashes that are
computed are posted on a publicly accessible web page,
either immediately or as soon as the polls are closed.
This web page is digitally signed by the election office
using a traditional signature key (not the key generated
by the trustees).
The posting of all of the encrypted ballots and hashes
gives all voters the ability to verify that their ballots have
been properly recorded. Additionally, this web page
makes it possible for observers to confirm the homomor-
phic aggregation of the individual ballots into a single
encryption of the sum of the ballots (which constitutes
an encryption of the election tallies).
At the end of the election, any set of trustees that
achieve the pre-set quorum threshold use their respective
private keys to decrypt the derived aggregate tally en-
cryption. This procedure is simple and efficient and can
be completed without interaction between the trustees.
We note that the individual encrypted ballots, from which
the aggregate encryption of the tallies is formed, are
never individually encrypted. However, each spoiled bal-
lot is individually decrypted using exactly the same pro-
cess that is used to decrypt the aggregate tally encryption.
The elements we just described make the core of the
workflow and are sufficient to compute an election tally
while preserving the privacy of the votes. We now ex-
plain various ways in which this simple workflow is hard-
ened in order to make sure that the tally is also correct.
All the techniques that follow enable the verification of
different aspects of the ballot preparation and casting.
Hardening encryption Since the tally does not in-
volve the decryption of any individual ballot, and since
the audit procedure relies on the fact that all counted bal-
lots are properly formed, it is crucial to make sure that all
the encrypted ballots that are added correspond to valid
votes. This is achieved by requiring the ballot marking
devices to compute, together with the encryption of the
votes, a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof
that each ballot is well-formed. Such a proof guaran-
tees that each ciphertext encrypts a valid vote and does
not leak any other information about the content of the
vote. As a side benefit, this proof can be designed to
make the ballots non-malleable, which provides an easy
technique to prevent the replay of old ballots (i.e., reject
duplicates).
Hardening decryption Making sure that the en-
crypted ballots are valid is not enough: we also need
to make sure that the tally is correctly decrypted as a
function of those encrypted ballots: otherwise, malicious
trustees (or trustees using corrupted devices) could pub-
lish an outcome that does not correspond to these ballots.
As a result, we require the trustees to provide evidence of
the correctness of the decryption operations that they per-
form. This can also be accomplished with NIZK proofs,
although exponential Elgamal and many other suitable
cryptosystems allow a single value to be published to en-
able observers to verify that the decryption is correct.
Hardening the timeline The procedures described
above prevent malfunctioning or corrupted voting termi-
nals or trustees to falsify individual ballots or decryption
operations.
The detection of manipulation of encrypted ballots can
be more effective by linking ballots with each other, us-
ing hash chaining. For this purpose, each ballot marking
device is seeded, at the beginning of the election, with a
public start value z0 that includes a unique identifier for
the election. This unique identifier should be chosen at
random shortly before the election.
This z0 seed is then used as follows: as soon as a voting
terminal with identifier m computes an encrypted ballot
bi, it computes a hash zi := H(bi‖m‖zi−1) and transmits
the value to the judge’s station. A truncated version of
zi forms the hash code that appears on the voter’s take-
home receipt. When the polls close, the final z value is
digitally signed and made public.
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As a result of this procedure, any removed ballot will
invalidate the hash chain which is committed to at the
close of the election and whose constituents appear on
voter’s taken-home receipts.
Hardening the link between the paper and electronic
election outcome The voting terminals print human-
readable versions of each ballot summary which can
be inspected for correctness by voters. In addition to
the cast or challenge procedure discussed above, a risk-
limiting audit provides further insurance that the elec-
tion outcome that could be computed from the paper bal-
lots matches the one that is computed from the decryp-
tion of the encrypted election outcome. To support the
risk-limiting audit, a cryptographic hash structure must
be built according to the SOBA schema (see section 5).
This structure is composed from the raw votes on each
of the ballots. While it would be possible to obtain these
raw votes by decrypting the individual encrypted ballots,
this operation (which would require participation of the
election trustees) is not necessary. Instead, the voting
terminals have all the data needed to construct the SOBA
structure and they can either build the structure in real
time during the election or encrypt it for later process-
ing.9
The full cryptographic protocol The resulting cryp-
tographic workflow is as follows.
1. The trustees jointly generate a threshold public
key/private key encryption pair. The encryption key
K is published.
2. Each voting terminal is initialized with the bal-
lot/election parameters, the public key K and a
unique seed z0 that is computed by hashing all elec-
tion parameters and using a public random salt.
3. When a voter completes the ballot marking process
selection to product a ballot v, the voting terminal
performs the following operations:
(a) It selects a unique ballot serial number s.
(b) It computes an encryption cv = EK(v) of the
vote, as well as a NIZK proof pv that cv is a
valid ballot encryption.
(c) It computes a hash code zi =
H(cv‖pv‖m‖zi−1), where m is the voting
terminal unique identifier.
9 The encryption here is simply an operational safeguard to avoid
storing raw cast vote records on the voting terminals or judge’s stations.
This can be accomplished with conventional encryption techniques and
need not involve the election trustees.
(d) It prints a paper ballot in two parts. The first
contains v in a human readable format as well
as s in a robust machine readable format (e.g.,
a barcode). The second is a voter take-home
receipt that includes, the voting terminal iden-
tifier m, the date and time, and the hash code
zi (or a truncation thereof).
(e) It transmits (cv, pv,m,zi,s) to the judge’s sta-
tion which will ultimately publish all of these
values except s.
4. When a ballot is cast, the serial number s is scanned
and sent to the judge’s station. The judge’s station
then marks the associated ballot as complete and
ready to be included in the tally.
5. When the polls are closed, the tally is computed: the
product c of all flagged encrypted votes is computed
and verifiably decrypted, providing an election re-
sult r.
6. A hash structure is computed to support the SOBA
audit described in section 5.
All stored data can then be digitally signed and pub-
lished by the local authority. Those audit data are con-
sidered to be valid if the hash chain checks and if all
cryptographic proofs check, that is, if the ballot validity
proofs check, it c is computed and decrypted correctly,
and if all spoiled ballots are decrypted correctly..
Write-in votes So far, we have not described how our
cryptographic construction can support write-in voting.
Support for write-in votes is required in Texas and many
other states. To be general-purpose, STAR-Vote should
adopt the vector-ballot approach [13], wherein there is a
separate homomorphic counter for the write-in slot plus
an extended NIZK proof to ensure that the write-in slot
only contains a string when the write-in counter is non-
zero. If there are enough write-in votes to influence
the election outcome, then the write-in slots, across the
whole election, will be mixed and tallied.
We note that, at least in Texas, write-in candidates
must be registered in advance. It’s conceivable that we
could simply allocate a separate homomorphic counter
for each registered candidate and have the STAR-Vote
terminal help the voter select the desired “write-in” can-
didate. Such an approach could have significant usability
benefits but might run afoul of regulations.
7 Coercion
In designing STAR-Vote, we made several explicit deci-
sions regarding how much to complicate the protocol and
impede the voter experience in order to mitigate known
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coercion threats. Specifically, one known threat is that a
voter is instructed to create a ballot in a particular way
but to then execute a decision to cast or spoil the ballot
according to some stimulus received after the ballot has
been completed and the receipt has been generated. The
stimulus could come, for example, from subtle motions
by a coercer in the poll site, the vibration of a cell phone
in silent mode, or some of the (unpredictable) data that is
printed on the voter’s receipt. Some prior protocols have
required that the receipt, although committed to by the
voting device, not be visible to the voter until after a cast
or spoil decision has been made (perhaps by printing the
receipt face down behind a glass barrier) and configuring
poll sites so that voters cannot see or be seen by members
of the public until after they have completed all steps. We
could insist on similar measures here, but in an era where
cell phones with video recording capabilities are ubiqui-
tous and eyeglasses with embedded video cameras can
easily be purchased, it seems unwise to require/ elabo-
rate measures which mitigate some coercion threats but
leave others unaddressed.
A similar threat of “chain voting” is possible with this
system wherein a voter early in the day is instructed to
neither cast nor spoil a ballot but to instead leave the poll
site with a printed ballot completed in a specified way.
This completed ballot is delivered to a coercer who will
then give this ballot to the next voter with instructions
to cast the ballot and return with a new printed ballot—
again completed as specified. Chain voting can be miti-
gated by instituting time-outs which automatically spoil
ballots that have not been cast within a fixed period after
their production and by attempting to prevent voters from
leaving poll sites with printed ballots, but, beyond simple
mitigations, we require no additional steps to make chain
voting impossible.
(Traditional paper ballots sometimes include a perfo-
rated header section which includes a serial number. A
poll worker keeps one copy of this number and verifies
that the ballot a voter wishes to cast matches the ex-
pected serial number. If so, the serial number is then de-
tached from the ballot and deposited in the box. STAR-
Vote could support this, but we believe it would damage
STAR-Vote’s usability. The timeout mechanism seems
like an adequate mitigation.)
We do, however, take measures to prevent wholesale
coercion attacks such as those that may be enabled by
pattern voting. For instance, The SOBA audit process
is explicitly designed to prevent pattern-voting attacks;
and the high assurances in the accuracy of the tally are
acheived without ever publishing the full set of raw bal-
lots.
An interesting concern is that our paper ballots have
data on them to connect them to electronic ballot records
from the voting terminals and judge’s console. The very
data that links a paper ballot to an electronic, encrypted
ballot creates a potential vulnerability. Since some indi-
vidual paper ballot summaries will be selected for post-
election audit and made public at that time, we are care-
ful to not include any data on the voter’s take-hme re-
ceipt which can be associated with the corresonding pa-
per balot summary.
7.1 Absentee and Provisional Ballots
There are several methods available for incorporating
ballots which are not cast within the STAR-Vote system,
such as absentee and provisional ballots. The simplest
approach is to completely segregate votes and tallies, but
this has several disadvantages, including a reduction in
voter privacy and much lower assurance of the accuracy
of the combined tally.
It may be possible to eliminate all “external” votes by
providing electronic means for capturing provisional and
remote ballots. However, for the initial design of the
STAR-Vote system, we have chosen to avoid this com-
plexity. Instead, we ask that voting officials receive ex-
ternal votes and enter them into the STAR-Vote system as
a proxy for voters. While this still does not allow remote
voters to audit their own ballots, the privacy-preserving
risk-limiting audit step is still able to detect any sub-
stantive deviations between the paper records of exter-
nal voters and their electronically recorded ballots. This
provides more supporting evidence of the veracity of the
outcome without reducing voter privacy.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
In many ways, STAR-Vote is a straightforward evolu-
tion from existing commercial voting systems, like the
Hart InterCivic eSlate, mixing in advanced cryptogra-
phy, software engineering, usability, and auditing tech-
niques from the research literature in a way that will go
largely unnoticed by most voters, while having a huge
impact on the reliability, accuracy, fraud-resistance, and
transparency of elections. Due to space constraints, this
document doesn’t even scratch the surface of the many
pragmatic features that our election administration col-
leagues have specified based on their experience running
prior elections. Clearly, we’re long overdue for election
systems engineered with all the knowledge we now have
available.
STAR-Vote also opens the door to a variety of inter-
esting future directions. For example, while STAR-Vote
is intended to service any given county as an island unto
itself, there’s no reason why it cannot also support re-
mote voting, where ballot definitions could be transmit-
ted anywhere a voter wishes to vote, and results sent back
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home. By virtue of STAR-Vote’s cryptographic mecha-
nisms, such a remote vote is really no different than a
local provisional vote and can be resolved in a similar
fashion, preserving the anonymity of the voter. (A varia-
tion on this idea was earlier proposed as the RemoteBox
extension [21] to VoteBox [20].) This could have impor-
tant ramifications for overseas and military voters with
access to a suitable impromptu polling place, e.g., on a
military base or in a consular office.
(We do not want to suggest that STAR-Vote would
be suitable for Internet voting. Using computers of un-
known provenance, with inevitable malware infections,
and without any systematic way to prevent voter bribery
or coercion, would be a foolhardy way to cast ballots.)
STAR-Vote anticipates the possibility that voting ma-
chine hardware might be nothing more than commodity
computers running custom software. It remains unclear
whether off-the-shelf computers can be procured to sat-
isfy all the requirements of voting systems (e.g., long-
term storage without necessarily having any climate con-
trol, or having enough battery life to last for a full day of
usage), but perhaps such configurations might be possi-
ble.
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